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Abstract  
The various financial crisis incidents during the two last decades and particularly since the 2007-2008 
Global Financial Crisis  has revealed the complexity of the interaction between bank market structure, 
regulation and the stability of the banking industry. Due to its effects on financial stability, banking 
market structure  has been a focus of academic and policy debates of which we prefer the market 
power paradigm. More precisely, the impact of competition and market concentration on the 
probability of financial crisis emerges as a crucial topic. Despite their importance, little is known 
about the relationship between Banking Market Power  and Bank Soundness from banks of MENA 
region.  This paper tries to overcome  the tradeoff between banking market power and financial 
(in)stability among 157 commercial banks  chosen from 18 countries of MENA region  between 2000 
and 2008. The results indicate that although the banks operate in a competitive market, they suffer 
from financial instability. The results also revealed a non-significant negative relationship between 
the rather low degree of market power and financial instability. In other words, we concluded that 
financial instability is not affected by competition in the banking market in the MENA region. 
 
Keywords: market power, financial stability, competition, MENA. 
Introduction  
The different hypotheses on how financial instability is provoked in a context of a competitive 
and concentrated banking market theoretically justify why it is interesting to analyze the 
relationship between banking market power and financial stability, knowing that economic 
theory does not provide clear conclusions and this relationship is still unclear.  
There are two main opposing theories on this matter are currently under debate. The 
“concentration – stability” or (“competition - fragility”) view highlights that more 
concentrated market allows banks to earn higher profit ; thus creating a capital buffer against 
crisis and reducing bank’s risk-taking behavior [Boyd and  De Nicolo (2006), Cetorelli and al 
(2007), Schaeck and  Cihak (2007) Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe (2006) Uhde and  Heimeshoff 
(2009), Maudos and  De Guevara (2010)]. In contrast, the “concentration – fragility” or 
(“competition – stability”) view argues that higher market concentration increases financial 
fragility. banks charge higher interest rates may enhance the risk taking behavior and raise the 
risk of default; consequently destabilizing the financial system [Staikouras and  Wood (2000) 
2 
 
,Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), Caminal and  Matutes (2002) Schaeck and al  (2009)] . In fact, 
the influence of a bank market structure on financial stability is not clear yet. In return, the 
relationship between market structure and bank soundness and focusing on concentration and 
competition was explained through a main channel which is the banking market power. 
On the one hand, under the traditional “competition –fragility” (or «concentration- stability) 
hypothesis; competitive banking system is more fragile. According to the hypothesis of 
charter/franchise value, competitive banks are forced to undertake risk-taking behaviour 
[Marcus (1984) and Keeley (1990)]. In fact, larger banks in concentrated market have more 
market power and may earn higher profit. In a similar way, higher profit is associated with 
higher franchise value, deterring bank managers from excessive risk-taking [Chang and al 
(2008)]. Since a higher (lower) market power makes banks generate more  (less) profit and 
increase (decrease)  their charter value [Xiaoqing Fu et al (2014), Mirzaei et al (2013), 
Breschger et al (2012)], this hypothesis is known as  the "charter value" hypothesis [(Keelly 
1990) and (Soedarmono, Machrouh, Tarazi 2011)].  
In an environment of increased competition, each bank has a low market power that can lead 
to financial instability. Several arguments can explain this state of affairs such as the existence 
of a weak banking margin that forces banks to undertake risky projects to improve their 
profits, which may result banking fragility. This idea is empirically supported by Kelly (1990) 
and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) who showed that increasing competition in the 
American banking system after the 80s financial deregulation reduced profitability and 
increased risk-taking  behavior and bank fragility.  
Another argument which puts forward the negative effect of competition on financial stability 
is the franchise value of the bank, i.e. the bank’s market value. If competition increases, profit 
decreases and causes a decrease in the bank’s value, forcing it to take on more risk in order to 
recover these losses (Maudos and De Guevara 2010). This hypothesis reproduces the idea that 
an increase in competition leads to a degradation of the bank’s market value and reveals a 
moral hazard that could lead the bank to increasingly opt for risky projects causing financial 
instability. 
On the other hand, the alternative hypothesis known as the "competition -stability" hypothesis 
rejects the traditional relationship between market power and financial stability.  If a bank has 
a strong market power, it will be able to set a high interest rate on loans (Boyd and De Nicolo 
2005). However, it would be able to fix such rate if it was under perfect competition. Hence, 
the generated profits increase and a cushion or a "capital buffer" is constructed to absorb all 
external shocks in case of a financial crisis and at the same time to reduce liquidity shocks 
(Vives 2010). These additional generated profits could cost bankruptcy, encouraging banks to 
undertake risky projects (Matutes and Vives 2000). The latter will then increase the stability 
of the banking system and the financial sector in general. Therefore, a dominance position in a 
concentrated market has a stabilizing effect on the system.   
Moreover, increase in interest rates on loans granted by dominant banks has a significant 
effect on borrowers [Beck, Demirgu-kunt and Levine (2007)]. When the cost of financing is 
high, borrowers choose risky projects with a high bankruptcy probability [(Maudos and De 
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Guevara (2010)]. Furthermore, portfolio quality plays an important destabilizing role. With 
these high interest rates, bank customers stop borrowing at that rate, leading to a deterioration 
in the loan portfolio of the bank. Because only the most risky projects are known by their high 
efficiency, borrowers will continue to borrow at that rate which will increase bankruptcy 
probability. Studying the relationship between competition and financial stability, Allen and 
Gale (2000) show that the banking system is more concentrated when the loan portfolio is 
risky. 
However in a concentrated banking market, having a strong market power is taken as an 
insurance that these banks are "too big to fail", which encourages them to take more risks. 
Mishkin (1999) found that such insurance creates a perverse incentive for banks which tend to 
choose risky assets and loans as these latter are known by their higher returns. This 
confidence expressed by dominant banks in a concentrated market is summed up in the 
premise that they will be recurred in the event of a crisis. This is actually a threat to financial 
stability. Therefore, from a theoretical point of view, the relationship between market power 
and financial stability remains ambiguous but requires more empirical investigations. 
To shed light on these two fundamental hypotheses, we have organized our paper as follows. 
In the first section, we present the contributions of the literature on the topic of market power. 
Then, in the second section we present market power and the hypotheses of financial 
instability provocation. The third section presents, discusses and interprets the regression 
results.  
Section 1: Banking Market Power: A Brief Review of the Literature:  
In this section we present a brief review of the literature on banking market power through 
examining several studies that focused on determining market power and its components. We 
review research that either validates market power hypotheses that examines the impact of 
market power on financial stability.  
In this review we start with examining research on market power theory. The theory can be 
summarized in two basic hypotheses, namely the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and 
the relative market hypotheses. Several studies examined market power in order to validate 
these hypotheses like those of Bain (1956); Mason (1939), Lloyad-Williams et al (1994), 
Samad (2008), Ariss (2010), Cocoress and Pellick (2010), and Sallami Chaffai (2011).  
Ariss (2010) on a sample of 60 countries and 821 banks found results that support the "quiet 
life" hypothesis. Cocoress and Pellick (2010), using data on the Italian banking sector for the 
period 1992-2007, tested the quiet life hypothesis according to which powerful firms in the 
market are less efficient. Their findings support the "quiet life" hypothesis. Lloyad-Williams 
et al. (1994) studied a sample of 92 Spanish banks over the period 1986-1988. The results 
show that the more concentration increases in a market, the more the cost of collusion 
decreases and results in higher profits for all banks. Their findings support the SCP 
hypothesis. 
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Besides the several measurement techniques used in market power research, we notice a 
significant number of studies using various methods and techniques to measure degree of 
competition in the banking system. As an example of measurement, we mention the 
conjectural variation model developed by Bresnahan and Lau (1982). This model has been 
used by several researchers in various banking studies such as Suominen (1994), Shaffer 
(1993), Berg and Kim (1998), Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) and Cocoress (2005).  
Suominen (1994) over a period of four years between 1986 and 1990 applies the model of 
collinearity variation to measure competition in the Finnish banking sector. The author found 
a monopolistic power in the pricing of banking services. Shaffer (1993) used a model of 
collinearity variation to estimate degree of competition in the Canadian banking sector over 
the period (1965-1989) and pointed to the existence of a perfect competition in the sector. 
Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) use almost the same approach as Shaffer (1993) on a sample of 
Japanese banks over the period 1974 and 2000. Their results indicate that competition has 
become very intense between 1995 and 1997. Moreover, using the collinearity variation 
model to study Norwegian banks between 1990 and 1992, Berge and Kim (1998) found that 
there is an oligopolistic behavior in both the retail and corporate sectors.  
Another measurement method of market power is the H –statistics of Panzar and Ross (1987). 
Many studies have used this model of which we mention those of Molyneux et al (1994, 
1996), Shaffer (1989), Vesala (1995), Bikker and Groeneveld (1998), Bikker and Haaf 
(2002), Bandt and Davis (2000).  
Molyneux et al (1994) used the H-statistic to assess competitive behavior in a number of 
European banking markets (German, French, Italian, Spanish, British banks) during the period 
from 1986 -1989. The results indicate the existence of monopolistic competition in the UK 
banking market. The same study by Molyneux et al (1996) on the Japanese banking market 
found a collusive behavior among banks. Thus, Shaffer (1989) was the first to apply this 
approach on a sample of American banks. The results strongly reject the existence of a 
collusive behavior between these banks. Vesala (1995) applied a similar approach to test the 
level of competition among Finnish banks during the period 1985 -1992. The results point to 
the existence of a monopolistic competition.  
Bikker and Groeneveld (1998) examined monopolistic competition behavior in European 
banks by applying Panzar and Ross’s model on some European Union banks during the 
period 1989 -1996. Bikker and Haaf (2002) applied the same model as Bandt and Davis 
(2000) on a sample of 23 countries (Australia, Canada, Netherlands, Great Britain and the 
United States). The results show the existence of a monopolistic competition. 
Other studies that sought to explore market power are studies that tried to examine the 
relationship between market power and financial stability, of which we mention the studies of 
Sallami, Chaffai (2011), Tarazi, Soedarmono and Machrouh (2011 ) Maudos and De Guevara 
(2010) and De Maudos Guevara (2010) and others. Below we present a summary table of the 
different studies of market power: 
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Tab.1. Studies of Banking Market Power: 
Authors Measurement methods Sample Period Results 
Tarazi, 
Soedarmono 
and Machrouh 
(2013) 
The authors use the 
Lerner index as a 
measurement of market 
power and the Z-score 
as a measurement of 
financial instability.  
Asian 
countries  
1994–
2009 
A high degree of 
market power is 
related to an increase 
in capital ratio, 
returns volatility and 
a higher insolvency 
risk.  
Sallami and 
Chaffai 
(2011) 
Both authors use a 
structural model which 
is the collinearity 
variation model to 
measure degree of 
banking market power. 
MENA 
region 
2002-
2009 
Estimates show that 
the banking sector in 
the region is far from 
being a monopoly or 
competitive. 
Tarazi, 
Soedarmono 
and Machrouh 
(2011) 
The authors use the 
Lerner index as a 
measure of degree of 
market power and the 
Z-score as a measure of 
financial instability. 
12 asian 
countries 
2001-
2007 
The existence of a 
high degree of market 
power generates a 
high degree of 
financial instability. 
Ariss (2010) Ariss uses the Lerner 
index to measure degree 
of banking competition 
at the sample country 
level and the Z-score to 
test financial stability. 
Africa, 
East and 
South 
Asia and 
the 
pacific  
 
1999-
2005 
The results show that 
increasing degree of 
market power led to a 
remarkable financial 
stability. 
Maudos and De 
Guevara (2010) 
These authors measure 
the degree of market 
power using the Lerner 
index and the z -score to 
measure financial 
instability 
 
25 
countries 
of the 
European 
Union, 
the 
United 
States, 
Canada 
and Japan  
 
2001-
2008 
The results show that 
an increase in market 
power negatively 
affects stability of the 
banking sector. 
 
Uhde and 
Heimeshoff 
(2009) 
 In this study, the 
authors choose 
concentration ratio to 
measure degree of 
25 
countries 
of the 
European 
1997-
2005 
The results show that 
there is a negative 
relationship between 
concentrated banking 
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market power and the 
Z-score to measure 
financial stability. 
union  markets and financial 
stability. 
Schaeck, Cihak 
and Wolfe 
(2007) 
This study seeks to 
examine the relationship 
between market power 
and banking system 
fragility. These authors 
use the H-statistic of 
Panzar and Ross (1987) 
as a measure of 
competition in the 
sample countries. 
38 
countries 
1990-
2003 
The results show that 
a high degree of 
market power in the 
banking sector 
reduces the risk of 
producing a systemic 
crisis. 
 
Maudos, De 
Guevara and 
Perez (2005) 
These authors attempt to 
study the evolution of 
market power in the 
banking sector of 
European countries 
using the Lerner index 
as a measure of market 
power degree. 
Germany,  
France, 
Italy 
Spain 
and the  
Uk 
1992-
1999 
The estimation results 
show that there is a 
heterogeneity of the 
results between 
countries. 
 
Uchida and 
Tsutsui (2005) 
They use a collinearity 
variation model to 
estimate degree of 
competition 
Japan 1974-
2000 
The results show that 
competition has 
become very intense 
between 1995 and 
1997. 
 
Cocoress 
(2005) 
The author studied 
competitive behavior 
between eight major 
Italian banks during the 
period 1988-2008 using 
a pricing model. 
Italy 1988-
2008 
The results show the 
existence of a perfect 
competition during 
this period. 
Maudos, De 
Guevara (2005) 
The authors tried to 
determine the variable 
components of market 
power. For this purpose 
they use the Lerner 
index to measure market 
power and HHI to 
measure market 
concentration. 
Spain  1986-
2002 
The results show that 
the variables used in 
the measurement of 
the Lerner index are 
significant while 
concentration is a 
poor indicator of 
market power. 
Berge and Kim using a collinearity Norway  1990- These banks have 
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(1998) variation model, Berge 
and Kim (1998) 
examine the degree of 
competition in 
Norwegian banks. 
1992 oligopolistic behavior 
in both the retail and 
corporate sectors. 
Bikker and 
Groeneveld 
(1998) 
The authors apply the 
model of Panzar and 
Ross on some European 
Union banks. 
European 
Union 
countries  
1989-
1996 
There is a 
monopolistic 
competition behavior 
in most of European 
banks. 
Molyneux et al 
(1994) 
The authors used the H-
statistic to measure 
competitive behavior in 
some European banking 
markets.  
Germany,  
France 
Italy 
spain and 
the Uk 
1986-
1989 
The results show the 
existence of 
monopolistic 
competition in the 
UK banking market. 
Suominen 
(1994) 
The author applies the 
collinearity variation 
model to measure 
competition in the 
Finnish banking sector. 
Finland  1986-
1990 
The author notes the 
existence of a 
monopoly power in 
the pricing of banking 
services. 
Shaffer (1993) The author estimate a 
collinearity variation 
model to measure 
degree of competition in 
the Canadian banking 
sector. 
Canada 1965-
1989 
The results show the 
existence of a perfect 
competition in this 
sector. 
Shaffer (1989)  She was the first who 
applied the Panzar and 
Ross’s approach on a 
sample of US banks. 
USA - The results strongly 
reject the existence of 
a collusive behavior 
between these banks. 
Source: the authors  
Section 2: Market Power: Financial Instability Provocation Hypotheses 
2.1- Concentration versus competition:  
In economics literature two traditional hypothesis have been forward to explain this axiom. 
On the one hand, we have the traditional theory of Industrial Economics which claims that 
concentration discourages competition [(Sallami and Chaffai (2011)] and the theory of 
contestable markets [Baumol (1982)] which assumes that if the input and output are free, 
competition may exist even if the market is concentrated.  
As far as concentration is concerned, traditional theory describes this structure by the 
existence of a small number of firms which have a strong market power and the existence of a 
less competitive behavior. This idea leads us to the classic argument of industrial organization 
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that shows the existence of a positive relationship between market structure, firms’ behavior 
in pricing and profits as well as the degree of market power. This idea is known as the 
paradigm Structure -Conduct-Performance [Bain (1956)].  
This paradigm tries to establish a relationship between market structure and market power. 
Knowing the extent of market power is based on profit and costs, economics indicate that 
there is a positive relationship between concentration and profit, i.e.  Developed concentration 
in a market where firms have higher market power allows firms to generate more profits.  
Another hypothesis supports the same view regarding the positive relationship between 
concentration and profits. However, this hypothesis, known as Structure-Efficiency 
hypothesis assumes that an efficient firm generates more profits and gains more market share 
and plays a role in increasing market concentration. Hence, concentration is not determined 
solely by market power but by efficiency of firms. Therefore, it is clear that concentration and 
competition are two distinct elements, i.e. the choice of concentration as a proxy for 
competition can be criticized [Schaeck, Cihak, Wolfe (2006)].  
Then, as for the theory of contestable markets [Baumol (1982], it supports the idea that 
competition may exist even in a concentrated market by liberalizing input and output. This 
theory aims at renewing and extending the classical theory of competition in industrial 
economics. It defines degree of economic contestability of a present operator in one market by 
its exposure to the threat of entry of new operators in the market [Sallami and Chaffai (2011)]. 
Several studies seek to study the complexity of such a relationship. Bikker (2004) noted that 
concentration may have an impact on competition in that an increase in firm financial size can 
enormously affect financial stability. Bikker and Haaf (2002) examined this relationship on a 
sample of 23 industrialized countries and found that increasing concentration discourages 
competition. However, Claessens and Laeven (2004), studying a sample of 50 countries, 
found that there is a positive relationship between concentration and competition. However, 
the results and conclusions of Claessens and Laeven (2004) show that concentration is a poor 
indicator of competition (degree of market power) in a competitive environment in which the 
banks operate.  
2.2- Concentration and Financial Stability:  
Theoretically and empirically, the impact of banking market concentration on financial 
stability remains ambiguous and without conclusive results. In the economics literature, we 
found two views that represent the two basic hypotheses of this concentration and stability 
axiom.  
On the one hand, there is the "concentration-stability" hypothesis which assumes the presence 
of a positive relationship between concentration and financial stability. Indeed, in a 
concentrated banking system, banks generate more profits leading to a cushion or a "capital 
buffer" that absorbs all macroeconomic shocks and external liquidity shocks [Boyd al (2004)]. 
Similarly, Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995) studied USA bank's consolidations  and found 
that the resulting concentration contributes to financial stability. The same result is found by 
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Craig and Santos (1997) for American banks, examining profitability and risk before 
consolidation. Thus, Boyd and Prescott (1986) showed that a concentrated banking system 
consisting of a small number of large banks mitigates risk through effective portfolio 
diversification.  
Secondly, with respect to the second hypothesis, we find that there is a negative relationship 
between concentration and stability known by the "concentration-fragility" hypothesis [Uhde 
and Heimeshoff (2009); Mishkin (1999)] found that in a banking system with a limited 
number of banks not to go bankrupt represents a public or a national interest. This is known as 
the "too big to fail" principle according to which although the bank is large, it has a warranty 
to absorb all external shocks and not to go bankrupt. 
According to this view every large bank may undertake riskier investments that may 
subsequently affect financial stability. The Subprime crisis in 2007 is an example when 
several banks despite their giant size went bankrupt like the Lehmann Brother bank. 
Moreover, Boyd and De Nicolo (2006) showed that an increase in the interest rate for loans 
may encourage risk-taking behavior among investors, which leads to increased probability of 
bank failure and significantly affects financial stability.  
Another mechanism of financial instability provocation is presented by Cetorelli and others 
(2007) where they showed that the effect of diversification of risk may affect managerial 
efficiency by increasing the likelihood of operational risk and subsequently provoking 
financial instability (systemic risk).   
From an empirical point of view, several studies have been conducted to examine the 
relationship between concentration and financial stability. During a 7-year period from 1993 
to 2000, De Nicolo et al (2004) showed that for an increasingly concentrated banking system, 
level of systemic risk increases. Over the period 1999 to 2004 and on a sample of 10 
European countries including Switzerland, Schaeck and Cihak (2007) and Schaeck, Cihak and 
Wolfe (2006) showed that in a more competitive environment banks generate more capital 
buffering. Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) studied a sample of 2,600 banks in 25 European 
countries over the period 1997 to 2005 found that a concentrated domestic banking market 
has a negative effect on financial stability. 
2.3- Competition and Financial Stability:  
In addition to the hypotheses on the concentration -stability relationship, the study of the 
relationship between competition and financial stability bear on two basic points of view. On 
the one hand, there is the "competition- stability" hypothesis that highlights a positive 
relationship between competition and financial stability, and on the other hand there is the 
"competition - fragility" hypothesis which highlights a negative relationship between 
competition and stability.  
The "competition - fragility" hypothesis supports the idea that an excess of banking 
competition leads to financial instability for several reasons. If the bank margin is low, banks 
are forced to invest in risky projects in order to increase their profits resulting in increased 
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bank fragility [Maudos and De Guevara (2010)]. Another reason is presented by the franchise 
value of a bank. If competition increases, profit of each bank decreases, which leads to a 
degradation in the bank’s market value. To recover these losses each bank will be forced to 
undertake riskier activities and collect less capital increasing thus financial instability.  
Kelly (1990) supported the idea that competition between larger banks after the late 80s 
financial deregulation encouraged banks to take more risks which reduced the charter value of 
a bank (charter value hypothesis). Smith (1984) highlighted a theoretical model of how 
increased competition for deposit banks may result in an increase in banking system 
vulnerability. Beck et al (2006) supported the competition -fragility hypothesis and they 
showed that countries with a less competitive banking system are the least affected by 
banking crises than countries with high banking competition. Similarly, Besanko and Thakor 
(1993) showed that banks seek riskier portfolios when competition increases. Matutes and 
Vives (2000) found that intense competition provides for a maximum increase of bank risks. 
Hellman, Murdoch and Stiglitz (2000) proposed that an acceleration of competition forces 
financial institutions to engage in risky investments.  
Vives (2010) tried to investigate this hypothesis through looking into mechanisms of financial 
instability provocation in a context of competition in a banking market. He found that 
competition affects financial stability through two mechanisms: the first is through the 
increasing problem of coordination among depositors and investors liabilities-wise and 
through liquidity and bank panics which can be systemic. The secondly is through increased 
incentives for risk-taking and likelihood of bankruptcy.  
As for the first mechanism, Vives (2010) found that competition is not responsible for the 
fragility and vulnerability in any market structure [Matutes and Vives (1996)]. In general, 
liquidity shocks take place after a massive withdrawal of deposits by individual depositors, 
while the modern liquidity shocks are the result of non-renewal of short-term credits in the 
interbank market. Similarly, the second mechanism assumes that banks will have excessive 
incentives to take risks in the presence of a limited liability where there is a lack of funds and 
capital and in the presence of moral hazard. From the perspective of limited liability, the bank 
takes on more risky assets that contribute to this lack of capital. Then, in such a high risk 
context the bank can't increase neither its market share nor profits. Therefore, intense 
competition may worsen the problem of excessive risk taking.  
An alternative hypothesis highlights a positive relationship between competition and financial 
stability. This latter is known as the "competition-stability" hypothesis. Since in a less 
concentrated market (with higher numbers) enjoying a higher market power degree, the bank 
will be able to set higher interest rates leading borrowers to undertake risky projects because 
of high financing costs. While these banks benefit from their dominant position that could be 
a form of guarantee or insurance against bankruptcy, this increased interest rates intensify 
risk-taking  behavior but increase profits and the generated returns from these loans [Boyd 
and De Nicolo (2005)]. 
Moreover, several studies attempted to test this relationship. Schaeck and others (2009) 
showed that stability is high in most competitive banking systems. Thus, Uhde and 
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Heimeshoff (2009) argued for the "competition - stability" hypothesis by showing the 
existence of a negative impact of market concentration on financial stability. Caminal and 
Matutes (2002) showed that banks in the case of monopolies tend to offer risky loans which 
may increase the probability of bank failure.  
From an empirical point of view, the results are more ambiguous than theory predicts. The 
studies of Keeley (1990), Capie (1995), Bordo, Redish and Rockoff (1996), Hoggarth, Milne 
and Wood (1998) supported the "competition - fragility" hypothesis, while the work of 
Staikouras and Wood (2000) supported the alternative hypothesis.  
As for Bordo, Redish and Rockoff (1996), they compared Canadian and American banks and 
found that Canadian banks are more stable because of their oligopolistic structures. Hoggarth, 
Milne and Wood (1998) found that British banks are less stable and more competitive. 
Moreover, Staikouras and Wood (2000) compared Spanish and Greek banks and found that 
Spanish banks are more competitive and more stable than Greek banks. 
Tab.2. Studies on Concentration, Competition and Financial Stability  
Hypotheses  Authors  Results  
Concentration-
competition 
relationship   
Bikker and Haff 
(2002) 
 According to a study of 23 industrialized 
countries, the authors find that concentration 
discourages competition. 
Claessens and 
Laeven (2004)  
The two authors show that concentration is a poor 
indicator of competition. 
Concentration-
stability 
hypothesis   
Benston, Hunter and 
Wall (1995) 
A study of the banking system of the United 
States shows that concentration contributes to 
financial stability. 
Craig  and Santos 
(1997) 
By analyzing profitability and risk of US banks, 
the authors show that concentration contributes to 
financial stability. 
Schaeck and Cihak 
(2007) 
A study of 10 European countries over the period 
1999 to 2004 shows that in a competitive 
environment, the most dominant banks generate 
more "capital buffer" profits which contributes to 
financial stability. 
Concentration-
fragility 
hypothesis 
Caminal and 
Matutes (2002) 
The authors show that banks under a monopole 
context tend to offer risky credits that may 
increase banking failure probability. 
 De Nicolo et  al 
(2004) 
A study conducted between 1993 and 2000 shows 
that in a concentrated banking system, systemic 
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 risk increases. 
Uhde and 
Heimeshoff  (2009) 
 A study of 25 European countries over the period 
1997 to 2005 shows that a concentrated banking 
market has a negative effect on financial stability. 
Concentration-
stability 
hypothesis  
 
Staikouras and 
Wood (2000) 
 They compared Spanish and Greek banks and 
they found that Spanish banks are more 
competitive and more stable than Greek banks. 
Schaeck et al (2009) The authors show that there is financial stability in 
most competitive banking systems.  
Smith (1984)  The author shows that increased competition 
between deposit banks contributes to banking 
vulnerability.  
Competition-
fragility 
hypothesis  
 
Murdoch and 
Stieglitz (2000) 
The author proposes that accelerated competition 
forces financial institutions to engage in risky 
investments.  
Beck et al (2006) The study indicates that countries with a less 
competitive banking system are the least affected 
by banking crises than countries a more 
competitive system.  
Vives (2010) The author found that an intense banking 
competition leads to a maximal increase of 
banking risk through a coordination problem 
between depositors and investors liability-wise or 
through an increase in risk-taking incentives and 
failure probability.  
Source : the authors  
Section 3: Specifications, Findings and Interpretations  
3.1. Methodology  
We use an econometric model inspired by a large empirical and theoretical literature like 
those of Soedarmono, Machrouh and Tarazi (2011.2013) and Sallami Chaffai (2011), Ariss 
(2010), Schaeck and Cihak (2007) and De Maudos Guevara (2007). 
STAB i,t =α1 LERNERi,t +α2 TCPIBi,t +α3 INFi ,t +α4 LDRi,t +α5 LLRi,t +α6TCPi,t 
+α7SIZEi,t  +εi,t 
With i and t respectively denote banks and time.  
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 The dependent variable STAB is region-based financial stability and measured by Z-score. 
At this level there are two main regressions; a main regression based on the ROA
1
 where 
there is Z-scoreROA and a robustness regression based on ROE
2
 where there is Z-scoreROE. 
The independent variable LERNER is a measure of the degree of market power of the banks 
in the sample, while the other independent variables are control variables.  
Moreover, we will apply three methods to study the relationship between market power and 
financial stability. The first method is ordinary least squares (OLS) based on a simple linear 
model that presents our basic model inspired by the work of Soedarmono and Tarazi 
(2011.2013). A second method to be applied is the fixed-effects generalized least squares (G 
LS), based on a fixed effects model where observed individuals (in this case banks) have 
well-defined and precise characteristics which do not vary in time and which are also 
independent and uncorrelated. The third method is random effects generalized least squares 
(GLS) where individual differences are random. 
3.2-Sample and period:  
Our database is built from multiple sources, i.e. bank-specific data are obtained from the 
BankScope database 2009, while macroeconomic data are obtained from the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund databases. Our sample consists of 18 countries in the MENA 
region consisting of 157 commercial banks distributed as follows: Algeria (10), Bahrain (9), 
Egypt (23), Iran (8), Iraq (1), Israel (6), Jordan (10 ), Kuwait (5), Lebanon (18) Libya (4), 
Morocco (9), Oman (5), Qatar (6), Saudi Arabia (9), Syria (1), Tunisia (14), the United Arab 
Emirates (15) and Yemen (4). Furthermore, the chosen period covers 9 years, from 2000 to 
2008. The studied banks are only commercial banks as such banks are free in choosing and 
executing their operations. These banks face also the same restrictions and reforms affecting 
all the countries in the MENA region.  
3.3: Results and their interpretations:  
3.3.1. The Lerner index:  
Several measures of market power like the collinearity variation model of Bresnahan and Lau 
(1982), the H-statistic of Panzar and Ross (1977-1987) and the Lerner index are used in the 
literature. Indeed, in our study we will choose the Lerner index as a measure of degree of 
market power. Several studies like those of De Guevara, Maudos, Pérez (2002), Maudos, De 
Guevara (2007); Berger, Klapper and Ariss (2009), Ariss (2010), Soedarmono, Machrouh and 
Tarazi (2011, 2013) have used this index. The choice of such an index relates to the simplicity 
of its empirical application where the formula is as follows:  
                                                          
1
 'Return On Assets - ROA' : An indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets 
 
2
 'Return on equity - ROE ':  shows how well a company uses investment funds to generate earnings growth. 
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With P the mean price or the output price of the bank as measured by the net expense / total 
assets ratio, Cm represents marginal cost calculated from estimating a translogarithmic cost 
function [Maudos and De Guevara (2005) Sallami and Chaffai (2011)]. 
However, we find that Total Cost (TC) depends on the prices of the three inputs (labor, 
physical capital and deposits) and is approximated by total expenses; in addition to total assets 
(TA), which represent the volume of production of the bank (the amount of outputs), as it 
depends on the technical changes represented by the variable (Trend). In fact, total assets are 
presented by the quantity provided by each bank qit. Labor price (w1it) is measured by the 
staff / total assets ratio. Capital price (w2it) is the fixed assets / total assets ratio. Funds price 
(w3it) is the interest costs / total deposits ratio. 
Marginal cost calculated from the equation above is as follows: 
 
To facilitate our estimates we used the ordinary least squares method where we estimated the 
translogarithmic function of total cost to have α1 and the γj for each factor prices. Therefore, 
marginal cost will change to: 
MCi = 
𝑻𝑪
𝑻𝑨⁄   [ α1  Ln TA +  ∑1
3
  γj  Ln( Wi) ] 
Table 4 shows the results of the OLS regression of the variables components of the Lerner 
index:  
Tab.4 The results of the OLS regression of the Lerner index: 
  Variables                                                                                                        Lerner Index 
Total assets                                                                                                 0.983
***
      (141.51) 
Labor price                                                                                                0.176
***
       (10.22) 
Capital price                                                                                               0.0875
***
      (6.85) 
Funds price                                                                                                 0.372
***
       (25.09) 
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R
2                                                                                                                               
                                             0.9594 
Nb. Obs.                                                                                                                            898 
Note: For the results we have the estimated coefficients of the variables components of the index and what is in 
parentheses is the t-statistic. Moreover the coefficients with (***) are significant at 1%. 
3.3.2-Measuring Financial Stability:  
Based on the work of Soedarmono, Machrouh and Tarazi (2011, 2013), Ariss (2010), 
Agoraki, Delis and Pasiouras (2011) and others, we opted for an appropriate measure of 
financial instability. For this purpose the variable Z-score is chosen as the index that measures 
degree of stability of banks. In this single indicator, we have three elements namely bank 
capitalization, bank income volatility and insolvency risk.  
Bank capitalization is measured by the equity to total assets (EQTA) ratio. To measure bank 
income volatility which reflects risk-taking strategies, standard deviations of ROA and ROE 
noted respectively SDROA
3
 and SDROE 
4
are used.  
In fact, this measure of bank income volatility represents a valuation of risk-taking degree in 
banks. Moreover, to assess insolvency risk we opted for two Z-score measures, one is based 
on ROA and the other is based on ROE and respectively denoted Z-scoreROA and Z-scoreROE 
as in the following formulas: 
ZROA = (ROAA
5
 + EQTA) / SDROA 
With ROA is the return on average assets, ROE is the return on average equity. 
ZROE = (ROAE
6
 +1) / SDROE 
3.3.3. Regression results of Lerner index-Z scores:  
All the results of the Lerner index for all banks in the sample show that most banks have a 
low Lerner index indicating automatically a small degree of market power. Therefore, the 
banks operate in a competitive banking market with a low degree of market power. As for 
financial stability of the banks in the MENA region, we find low Z- score values for ROA and 
ROE. This suggests that banks in the MENA region are poorly stable and face banking risks. 
However, when the Z-score index decreases the risk for banks is higher and then financial and 
banking stability deteriorates. As a first conclusion, banks in our sample operate in a market 
with high competition and suffer from financial instability 
The results of the main regression and the robustness regression are presented in tables 5, 6 
and 7. These tables present respectively the three OLS estimation methods MCO, random-
effects MCG and fixed-effects MCG. Interpretations of the main regression are drawn from 
                                                          
3
 standard deviation of ROA 
4
 standard deviation of ROE 
5
 return on average assets  
6
 return on average equity  
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analyzing table 5 while the interpretations of the robustness regression results are drawn from 
table 6.  
The results show a negative and a non-significant relationship between degree of market 
power and degree of financial stability. This implies that the low degree of market power is 
not the result of a low degree of financial stability. In other words, high competition in the 
banking market is not responsible for the poor performance of the banks in the studied 
countries.  
Our results are inconsistent with those of Ariss (2010) who found a positive and a significant 
relationship between market power and financial stability, suggesting that a high degree of 
market power results in a high degree of financial stability by reducing potential risks. The 
results of Ariss (2010) are also inconsistent with Soedarmono and others (2011), De Nicolo 
and others (2004) and Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) supporting the concentration-fragility 
hypothesis where a high degree of market power leads to a high degree of financial instability. 
Moreover, in the three tables we note that among the control variables the LDR ratio is 
significantly positive for all regressions implying that banks in the region with high bank 
liquidity helps stabilize banks. As for the macroeconomic variable of the GDP growth rate, it 
is significantly positive implying that robust growth helps maintain financial stability. 
Furthermore, inflation has a negative sign and its significance indicates it negatively affects 
financial stability. The last significant variable in the regressions is the variable "Size", 
indicating that size positively affects financial stability through increased risk-taking behavior 
by banks. 
Tab.5. The Relationship Market Power-Financial Stability by the OLS Method: 
Variables                            ZROA
 
ZROE 
Lerner -0.00026 (0.46) -0.00015 (-0.9) 
LDR 2.99
***
 (18.05) 0.024 (0.53) 
LLR 0.033* (1.88) -0.006 (-1.29) 
TCPIB 0.175*** (4.54) 0.015 (1.38) 
INF 0.016 (0.52) 0.025
***
 (2.89) 
TCP 0.776*** (3.67) -0.04 (-0.73) 
Size 4.04* (7.05) 0.909*** (5.56) 
R
2
 0.413 0.413 0.101 0.101 
Nb. Ob. 652 652 652 652 
Note: ZROA and ZROE denote respectively the Z-score which measures financial stability based on "return on 
assets" and "return on equity". Lerner is the Lerner index which measures degree of competition in the market, 
TCPIB is the GDP growth rate, INF is inflation rate, LDR is total loans to total deposits ratio. LLR is the loan 
loss reserve to total loan. TCP is the growth rate measured as a % of loans, Size is the logarithmic mean of total 
assets. This table shows the results of the estimates by the Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS) of the two 
models (in the sense of ZROA and in the sense of ZROE), where the first column shows the coefficients of the 
variables and the between brackets present the t- Student of the variables. (***) (**) and (*) indicate statistical 
significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
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Tab.6. The Relationship Market Power-Financial Stability by the Fixed Effects MCG 
Method: 
Variables                            ZROA 
 
ZROE 
Lerner                       -0.0003 (-0.69) -0.00022 (-1.08) 
LDR 0.805
***
 (5.83) 0.06 (0.94) 
LLR -0.07
***
 (-3.24) 0.02** (1.98) 
TCPIB 0.038 (1.44) 0.029** (2.41) 
INF -0.06** (-2.36) 0.018 (1.42) 
TCP 0.76*** (4.56) -0.017 (-0.22) 
Size 1.49* (1.8) 1.073** (2.79) 
R
2
 0.136 0.136 0.057 0.057 
Nb. Ob. 652 652 652 652 
Note: ZROA and ZROE denote respectively the Z-score which measures financial stability of banks based on 
"return on assets" and "return on equity". Lerner is the Lerner index which measures degree of competition in 
the market, TCPIB is the GDP growth rate. INF is inflation rate, is total loans to total deposits ratio. LLR is the 
loan loss reserve to total loan. TCP is the growth rate measured as a % of loans, Size is the logarithmic mean of 
total assets, T.Hausman is the probability of the Hausman test. This table shows the results of the estimates by 
the fixed effects Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method of the two models (in the sense of ZROA and in the 
sense of ZROE), where the first column shows the coefficients of the variables and what is in brackets shows the t-
Student of the variables., (*) (**) and (***) indicate respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Tab.7. The Relationship Market Power-Financial Stability by the Random Effects MCG 
method: 
Variables                            ZROA
 
ZROE 
Lerner                       -0.00028 (-0.064) -0.00015 (-0.96) 
LDR 1.20
***
 (8.69) 0.033 (0.66) 
LLR -0.03 (-1.64) -0.0033 (-0.56) 
TCPIB 0.06** (2.25) 0.019* (1.76) 
INF -0.059* (-1.85) 0.022** (2.43) 
TCP 0.79** (4.81) -0.037 (-0.62) 
Size 2.46*** (3.73) 0.879*** (4.8) 
R
2
 0.41 0.41 0.19 0.19 
Nb. Ob. 652 652 652 652 
T. Hausman - - 0.1317 0.1317 
Note: ZROA and ZROE denote respectively the Z-score which measures financial stability of banks based on 
"return on assets" and "return on equity". Lerner is the Lerner index which measures degree of competition in 
the market, TCPIB is the GDP growth rate. INF is inflation rate, is total loans to total deposits ratio. LLR is the 
loan loss reserve to total loan. TCP is the growth rate measured as a % of loans, Size is the logarithmic mean of 
total assets, T.Hausman is the probability of the Hausman test. This table shows the results of the estimates by 
the random effects Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method of the two models (in the sense of ZROA and in the 
sense of ZROE), where the first column presents the coefficients of the variables and what is in brackets shows the 
t-Student of the variables. (*) (**) and (***) denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Conclusion:  
Through the literature review, we concluded that the relationship between market power and 
financial stability remains ambiguous. From a theoretical point of view, this relationship bears 
on two basic hypotheses, the "competition-stability" hypothesis and the "competition-
fragility" hypothesis. 
Our purpose is to study the validity of these hypotheses on a sample of 157 commercial banks 
in the MENA region distributed as follows: Algeria (10) Bahrain (9) Egypt (23) Iran (8) Iraq 
(1), Israel (6), Jordan (10), Kuwait (5), Lebanon (18) Libya (4), Morocco (9), Oman (5), Qatar 
(6), Saudi Arabia (9), Syria (1) , Tunisia (14), the United Arab Emirates (15) and Yemen (4) 
over a period of 9 years between 2000 and 2008.  
In order to examine the impact of market power on financial stability we used two models, a 
main regression within the sense of ROA and a robustness regression in the sense of ROE. 
We used the Z-score index as a measure of financial stability where a high value of the latter 
indicates a better banking performance. We also used the Lerner index as a measure of degree 
of market power where a high value of the Lerner index implies a monopoly power and a low 
value of the Lerner index implies a low market competition.  
In fact, the results of measuring these two variables indicate that the banking market in the 
MENA region is a competitive market because of the low degree of market power. Moreover, 
banks in this region suffer from financial instability as indicated by the low value of the Z-
score index.  
Tables 5, 6 and 7 respectively include the results of the OLS estimation, the random-effects 
MCG and the fixed-effects MCG where the Lerner variable is negatively non-significant 
implying that in our sample, competition in the MENA banking market does not lead to 
financial instability. Therefore, our initial hypothesis has been validated according to which 
weak market power does not determine financial instability. 
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